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Introduction: Territoriality of the
Vote: A Framework for Analysis
Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy
1.1. Introduction
Over the last 40 years the institutional landscape in Western Europe
has changed considerably. One of the most notable transformations
of the state concerns processes of decentralization, federalization and
regionalization. This development is well documented by the regional
authority index (RAI) developed by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010).
For the 13 Western European countries which are the subject of research
in this book, they observe that each of them underwent regional reform
except for the Swiss cantons and the Faroe Islands. Not only has the
authority exercised by regional governments increased but the biggest
driver of this growth of regional authority has been the proliferation of
elected institutions at the regional level (Marks et al., 2010).
Indeed, regional elections have been introduced in various countries
at various times in Western Europe. Following the Second World War,
regional elections have been held since 1945 for Austrian and German
Länder, the Faroe Islands in Denmark, regioni a statuto speciale in Italy,
Dutch provincies, Swedish län, Swiss cantons and Northern Ireland in
the UK. Direct elections were introduced in the 1970s in the Deutsche
Gemeinschaft in Belgium, Danish amter and Greenland, regioni a statuto
ordinario in Italy and Norwegian fylker. During the 1980s, French régions
and Spanish comunidades autónomas followed, and in the 1990s, elec-
tions were introduced for gemeenschappen and gewesten in Belgium,
Greek nomoi, and London, Scotland and Wales in the UK. Clearly,
regional elections are on the rise. We now have more regional elections
in Western Europe than ever before and their importance has increased
significantly as well.
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2 Introduction
The decentralization processes and introduction of regional elec-
tions has not gone unnoticed by political scientists. Most scholars
analyzing regional voting behavior are interested in the difference
between the national and the regional vote. The starting point of these
studies is often the same – namely, the second-order election model
(Henderson and McEwen, 2010; Jeffery and Hough, 2001, 2003, 2006,
2009; Tronconi and Roux, 2009). The basic tenet of the second-order
election model is that regional elections are subordinate to first-order
national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). As a result, fewer voters tend
to turn out, and those voters who bother to cast a vote have a tendency
to support opposition, small or new parties to the detriment of those
parties in national government.
The rank order of elections has recently been contested by quantita-
tive, aggregate studies. Henderson and McEwen (2010) and Schakel and
Dandoy (2014) find that the regional turnout is just a bit less than the
turnout for national elections for many regions, and in some regions,
such as some of the Swiss cantons and small (islands) regions, such
as Åland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Valle d’Aosta, the regional
turnout surpasses the turnout for national elections. In addition, a study
of more than 2900 regional elections (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013) shows
that the extent to which government parties lose vote share in regional
elections varies hugely across regions, and it depends on the amount of
authority exercised by the regional government and the extent to which
non-statewide parties (NSWPs) participate.
This volume aims to study regional elections whilst avoiding what
has been termed by Jeffery and Wincott (2010) ‘methodological
nationalism’ – that is, the tendency of political scientists to take the
national level as the unit of analysis. This tendency to choose the
nation-state as a unit of analysis has been widespread across election
research, and has often been an unreflected and uncritical, or ‘natural-
ized’, choice. As a result, most research on elections and election surveys
concerns ‘national’ elections and more, in particular, lower chamber
and presidential elections. A consequence of methodological national-
ism is that phenomena not manifest or significant at the regional scale
of analysis remain ‘hidden from view’ or, as Michael Keating puts it
more directly (1998, p.ix), ‘territorial effects have been a constant pres-
ence in European politics, but . . . too often social scientists have simply
not looked for them, or defined them out of existence where they con-
flicted with successive modernization paradigms’. This is not to say
that the nation-state is becoming redundant or rendered insignificant
as regional-scale politics becomes more important. The national scale
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Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy 3
remains the primary focus of most citizens, political parties and interest
groups in most areas of political contestation in most advanced democ-
racies. What this collection of country studies aims to achieve is to
examine regional elections ‘on their own terms’ instead of taking the
‘prism’ of national-level politics as the natural starting point (Jeffery and
Schakel, 2013).
This book presents 13 country studies which analyze regional election
results in depth. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Greece, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK.1 These are all long-standing democracies with
a history of more than five decades of holding free and fair national
elections (except for Spain). The selection is worth studying because
the countries vary considerably in their experience with regional elec-
tions: some have held regional elections for more than 50 years (Austria,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) while others
introduced elections in the 1970s (Denmark and Norway), 1980s (France
and Spain) and 1990s (Belgium, Greece and the UK). In addition, some
countries introduced regional elections at various times for different
territories: Belgium introduced them for the Deutsche Gemeinschaft in
1974, for the Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest in 1989, and for the Vlaamse
Gemeenschap and the Région Wallonne in 1995; in Germany, elections
for the East German Länder were reinstated in 1990; and in Italy and
Spain, elections for regioni a statuto ordinario, respectively, non-historic
comunidades autónomas, were introduced at later dates than for regioni a
statuto speciale and the historic comunidades autónomas.
Regional elections are held to elect representatives for the regional
government and therefore we need to define regional government.
It is the government of a coherent territorial entity situated between
the local and national levels with a capacity of authoritative decision-
making (Hooghe et al., 2010). In more practical terms, Hooghe et al.
(2010) include levels of government with an average population greater
than 150,000. For the purpose of this volume, we include regional gov-
ernments which hold direct elections and exclude those with indirect
elections or which do not hold them. This decision leaves the vexed
issue of multiple regional tiers which hold direct elections in a coun-
try. We have decided to focus on the highest regional tier, which in all
cases is also the most authoritative regional government. The following
subnational elections are excluded: provincial elections in Belgium, Italy
and Spain; departmental (canton) elections in France; Kreise elections in
Germany; and county elections in the UK. A list of the regional elections
analyzed in this book is presented in Table 1.1.
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4 Introduction
Table 1.1 Countries, regions and regional elections covered
Country Region N Elections N RAI
First Last Min Max
Austria Länder 9 1945 2010 131 17.0 18.0
Belgium Deutsche Gemeinschaft 1 1974 2009 10 5.0 16.0
Brussels Hoofdstedelijk
Gewest
1 1989 2009 5 18.0 18.0
Vlaamse Gemeenschap 1 1995 2009 4 20.0 20.0
Région Wallonne 1 1995 2009 4 20.0 20.0
Denmark Amter 15 1974 2001 120 10.0 10.0
Region 5 2005 2009 10 9.0 9.0
Faroe Islands 1 1945 2008 19 20.0 20.0
Greenland 1 1979 2009 10 10.0 20.0
France Régions 21 1986 2010 84 8.0 8.0
Corsica 5 1986 2010 3 8.0 8.5
Germany Länder (west) 10 1949 2011 147 20.0 21.0
Länder (east) 6 1990 2009 25 21.0 21.0
Greece Nomoi 50 1994 2006 200 8.0 8.0
Periphereis 10 2010 2010 10 8.0 8.0
Italy Regioni a statuto speciale 5 1947 2009 66 9.0 18.0
Regioni a statuto ordinario 15 1970 2010 120 7.0 14.0
The Netherlands Provincies 12 1946 2011 194 13.5 14.5
Norway Fylker 19 1975 2011 171 10.0 10.0
Spain Comunidades autónomas
(historic)
3 1980 2011 26 13.5 15.5
Comunidades autónomas
(non-historic)
16 1983 2011 107 12.5 15.0
Sweden Län 21 1946 2011 445 10.0 10.0
Switzerland Cantons 26 1945 2009 376 19.5 19.5
UK Greater London
Authority
1 2000 2008 3 9.0 9.0
Northern Ireland 1 1945 2007 13 1.0 9.5
Scotland 1 1999 2007 3 16.5 16.5
Wales 1 1999 2007 3 11.5 11.5
Total 254 2311
Notes: RAI= regional authority index score (Hooghe et al., 2010).
We apply a common framework which distinguishes between five
dependent variables. Each country chapter will discuss congruence
between the regional and national vote, turnout, change in vote shares
between regional and national elections, government congruence, and
electoral strength for NSWPs. These dependent variables are selected
because they are thought to reflect the most important elements
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Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy 5
of regional voting behavior (see p.18–24). In addition, each of the
contributions will discuss a common set of hypotheses in order to
be able to derive the most important factors which lead to divergent
regional election results.
In addition to a deductive part, the country chapters will employ an
inductive research strategy. The contributors of the country studies were
asked to assess how far they could identify factors which may impact
on regional voting behavior in addition to the set of variables identi-
fied in the common framework. In other words, a ‘top-down’ approach
is combined with a ‘bottom-up’ line of research. In the Conclusion
(Chapter 15) we will make an overall assessment of the various proposed
independent variables. We hope that the combination of deductive
and inductive elements in the research framework does justice to the
appeal of methodological nationalism for studying regional elections
on their own terms and, at the same time, acknowledges the valuable
work done by scholars who incorporated ‘nationalist’ assumptions in
their work.
In the remainder of this Introduction, we proceed in two steps. First,
we confront the use of the second-order election model as the domi-
nant framework in regional election research by pointing out conceptual
and empirical challenges. Next, we present the analytical framework
of this volume, which consists of two parts. The first part focuses on
the factors that may impact on regional election behavior and identifies
regional institutions and territorial cleavages as two broad categories of
independent variables. The second part concentrates on the dependent
variable side and introduces congruence of the vote as the main aspect
of regional electoral behavior. In order to gain an insight into the causes
of dissimilarity in the vote, this framework also includes turnout, vote
share changes, government congruence and vote shares for NSWPs as
secondary dependent variables. We end by briefly introducing the coun-
try studies, and we save the summary and implications of the country
chapter findings for the Conclusion.
1.2. Conceptual and empirical challenges
for the second-order election model
Perhaps the most often used framework to study regional elections is
the second-order election model. The core claim of the second-order
election model is that there is a hierarchy in perceived importance of
different types of election. National elections are of a first-order nature
and all other elections, such as European, subnational, second chamber
10.1057/9781137025449 - Regional and National Elections in Western Europe, Edited by Régis Dandoy and Arjan Schakel
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
ww
.p
al
gr
av
ec
on
ne
ct
.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ur
ich
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
ve
Co
nn
ec
t -
 2
01
4-
09
-1
7
6 Introduction
and by-elections, are subordinate to first-order elections. Because there is
‘less at stake’ in second-order elections, voters are prompted to use their
vote to vent their spleen about national-level politics (Reif and Schmitt,
1980). The second-order model echoes earlier work on US Congres-
sional mid-term elections (Miller and Mackie, 1973; Tufte, 1975), and
US scholars have labeled these elections ‘barometer’ elections (Anderson
and Ward, 1996) or mid-term ‘referendums’ (Simon et al., 1991; Simon,
1989; Carsey and Wright, 1998).
The core assumption underlying the second-order election model is
that there is ‘less at stake’ in regional elections, and this leads to three
predictions with regard to regional election results:
1. Turnout in regional elections is lower than for national elections.
2. Government parties lose votes.
3. Small, new and opposition parties gain votes.
Because there is generally less at stake in regional than in national elec-
tions, voters are inclined not to cast a vote in the former. Voters who do
turn out use regional elections to send a signal to the party in statewide
office by voting for the party in opposition or voting for new and/or
small parties. We argue that the second-order election model may be
challenged on a conceptual as well as empirical basis.
If one traces the intellectual roots of the second-order election model,
one will stumble upon a developed US scholarship on mid-term Con-
gressional elections (Schakel and Jeffery, 2013). The term ‘second-order
election’ was introduced by Reif and Schmitt (1980) to explain pat-
terns observed in the first European Parliament (EP) election. They were
inspired by the work of Dinkel (1977) on German Länder elections, who
was in turn influenced by the US literature on mid-term elections (Reif,
1997). Elections for the US Congress are held every second year and they
coincide with the US presidential elections once every four years. Hence,
a mid-term election occurs when an election for Congress is held at mid-
term between two presidential elections. The idea is that every election
(i.e. including state and local elections) is subordinate to the first-order,
presidential election and is used by voters to send a signal to the presi-
dential party. It appears that mid-term Congressional elections produce
a systematic loss for the party of the president and only 2 out of a total
of 28 mid-term elections between 1900 and 1980 did not produce a loss
(Niemi and Fett, 1986). The US literature takes the mid-term loss as a
given and tries to explain the magnitude of this loss (e.g. Erikson, 1988;
Soberg Shugart, 1995).
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Mid-term elections have produced a large scholarship, but, unfortu-
nately, this literature is not very useful for analyzing regional elections
in Europe due to US ‘exceptionalism’ with regard to its electoral insti-
tutions. Mid-term elections are particularly rare for regional elections
in European countries. National and regional elections often have inde-
pendent electoral cycles, and regional elections can be placed anywhere
in the national electoral cycle. In the US, horizontal and vertical simul-
taneity is widespread – that is, several subnational and national elections
are held on the same date whereas the picture is far more varied and
complex in Europe. In addition, the terms for office in the US are fixed
whereas early (or late) elections are common in Europe. Finally, the
US has a clear two-party structure with regular government alternation,
which enables voters to use state and mid-term elections to send a signal
to the president in office by voting for the opposition party. In Europe,
multiparty coalitions are the norm and government alternation is not
regular for all parties. In addition, there is a relatively high turnover of
parties in the party systems of many European countries compared with
the US party system. Together, these factors hamper a voter’s ability to
use their regional vote to send a signal to the national electoral arena.
Second-order election scholars adhere to the same assumption as
those scholars across the ocean, assuming that electoral behavior in
second-order elections is shaped by political factors in the first-order
arena and that voters use second-order elections to express satisfaction
or disappointment toward national politics. In other words, regional
election results can be largely explained by observing which parties are
in government or in opposition at the statewide level. Reif and Schmitt
(1980, p.8) stated that second-order elections may be found beyond
the remit of EP elections and that local, second chamber, by-elections
and regional elections may be second-order as well. This has led sev-
eral authors to apply second-order election model to regional elections
(Pallares and Keating, 2003; Dupoirier, 2004; Floridia, 2010). In partic-
ular, Jeffery and Hough have advanced the study on regional elections.
They started with German Land elections (2001, 2003) and included in
two subsequent studies Austria, Belgium and Italy (2006) and Canada,
Spain and the UK (2009). As soon as they went beyond the German
case, Jeffery and Hough recognized that the ‘analytical lens for exploring
regional elections, that of “second-orderness” is found wanting’ (2003,
p.211). This led them to analyze regional power and depth of terri-
torial cleavages next to the placement of the regional election in the
national election cycle as variables to explain government party losses.
Nevertheless, they remained ‘captured’ within the second-order election
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8 Introduction
framework by hypothesizing that ‘the more significant decision-making
powers there are at stake in sub-state elections, the less second-order
voting behavior will be’, and that ‘if sub-state elections are held in areas
with distinctive territorial identities, voters are more likely to disconnect
themselves from the first-order, statewide arena’ (Jeffery and Hough,
2009, p.224).
More recently, Charlie Jeffery realized that we need to go ‘beyond the
nation-state’ (Jeffery, 2011, p.137) to understand political processes at
the regional level. He posits that regional election research, including
his own work, has been subject to ‘methodological nationalism’ – that is,
‘a set of assumptions that establish the nation-state as a natural unit of
analysis’ (Jeffery, 2011, p.137). Reporting on contributions to an edited
collection on regional elections in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the UK, Jeffery and Hough (2006, p.252) conclude: ‘The
general finding, then, is that most sub-state elections do indeed appear
to be second-order, subordinate to voters’ considerations of state-level
politics.’ However, in later work Jeffery acknowledged that
there may be a sense of self-fulfilling prophesy at play here. Research
findings may be path-dependent on research questions. If other start-
ing points are taken which treat regional elections on their own
terms, rather than as functions of national elections, a different or
at least more nuanced picture might emerge.
(Schakel and Jeffery, 2013, p.4)
The second-order election model can be empirically challenged as
well. Regional election studies confirmed several predictions of the
second-order electionmodel. Regional turnout is lower than for national
elections (Pallares and Keating, 2003; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014); gov-
ernment parties tend to lose vote share whereas opposition, new and
small parties gain in regional elections (Jeffery and Hough, 2003; Pallares
and Keating, 2003); and the extent to which government parties lose
and opposition parties win vote share varies according to the place-
ment of the regional election in the national electoral calendar (Jeffery
and Hough, 2003). However, the same set of studies also concludes that
the degree to which regional elections may be considered second-order
varies substantively. Even if regional elections are frequently second-
order, it is not in a uniform way across countries. Canadian elections
are considered to be clearly non-second order (Jeffery and Hough, 2009,
p.231), and France displays a larger incongruence between national and
regional elections than Austria or Germany (Dupoirier, 2004, p.585).
Jeffery and Hough (2003) find only partial confirmation that regional
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Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy 9
elections are second-order in the case of Germany and Spain. In addi-
tion, they observe a reduced tendency to follow the national electoral
cycle and a growing dissimilarity between regional and national elec-
tion results. Similarly, Tronconi and Roux (2009) conclude in the case
of the Italian regions that the degree to which regional elections may
be considered to be second-order depends on the decade of observation.
In addition, Pallares and Keating (2003) observe that Spanish governing
parties generally lose regional elections, but national opposition parties
do not consistently win. For French regions, Dupoirier (2004, p.590)
concludes that only some of the regions can be considered clearly sec-
ond order or nationalized. Finally, in our own comparative work we
conclude that the second-order election predictions are not born out for
the majority of regions. Turnout in the regions of Switzerland, Denmark
(the Faroe Islands and Greenland) and Italy (special statute regions) is
greater for regional than for national elections, and those regions which
hold elections at their date of choosing report higher turnout rates than
those which hold their elections on the same date (Schakel and Dandoy,
2014). With respect to government party losses, Schakel and Jeffery
(2013) conclude that only 18 per cent out of a total of 2933 regional
elections clearly follow second-order model predictions.
In conclusion, the second-order election model has limited explana-
tory power with regard to regional election results and the model can
be questioned on a conceptual level as well. Our aim in this book is
to adopt a framework of analysis which allows one to study regional
elections ‘on their own terms’ and which, at the same time, also
acknowledges that the second-order election model might have some
merit.
Regional election research shows that the ‘stakes-based’ assumption in
the second-order election model provides an important element in the
explanation of regional election results. Regional-scale factors and pro-
cesses will play a larger role when the regional electoral arena becomes
more relevant. Following Jeffery and Hough (2009), we may expect that
institutional factors, most importantly regional authority, and territo-
rial cleavages will increase the stakes of a regional election. Each set of
factors is discussed below.
1.3. What is at stake: Institutions
The authority exercised by regional government is often considered to
be a key institutional variable capable of influencing regional electorates
and regional party strategies (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Pallarés
and Keating, 2003; Swenden, 2006). Thorlakson (2007) argues that
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10 Introduction
decentralization gives both parties and voters the incentive and oppor-
tunity to mobilize and respond to locally defined issues which may
lead to the development of ‘unique’ party systems at the regional level.
With decentralization, the regional level becomes more relevant to the
voter. Voters may understand that the regional level has independent
policy-making capacity and may vote according to their evaluation of
the performance of regional government. This creates in turn an incen-
tive for parties in the regional arena to deviate their policies from the
statewide party when adhering to these statewide party policies involves
electoral risks in the regional arena (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Maddens
and Libbrecht, 2009). Decentralization also creates multiple regional
arenas of competition, which leads to the potential for issues to be mobi-
lized differently across the regions, resulting in variation in dimensions
of conflict and variation in voter and party alignments (Thorlakson,
2009). A shift of authority in fiscal matters and policy-making from the
national to the regional level intensifies these processes.
The relevance of the regional political arena for regional electorates
and regional parties can be assessed according to various indicators.
Most importantly we analyze the effects of decentralization of govern-
ment authority but we also identify several characteristics of regional
election systems which may impact on the regional vote. These are the
timing of regional elections (simultaneity of elections), electoral rules
(proportional versus majoritarian systems) and electoral thresholds.
Decentralization of government authority
The most detailed political decentralization measurement is the regional
authority index (RAI) developed by Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010).
This measurement distinguishes between self-rule (authority exercised
by a regional government over those who live in the region) and shared
rule (authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives
in the country as a whole). Self-rule and shared rule are operationalized
according to the following eight dimensions.
Self-rule is the sum of the following four dimensions:
• Institutional depth: the extent to which a regional government is
autonomous rather than deconcentrated (0–3);
• Policy scope: the range of policies for which a regional government is
responsible (0–4);
• Fiscal autonomy: the extent to which a regional government can
independently tax its population (0–4);
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• Representation: the extent to which a region is endowed with an
independent legislature and executive (0–4).
Shared rule is the sum of the following four dimensions:
• Lawmaking: the extent to which regional representatives co-determine
national legislation (0–2);
• Executive control: the extent to which a regional government
co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings (0–2);
• Fiscal control: the extent to which regional representatives
co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues (0–2);
• Constitutional reform: the extent to which regional representatives
co-determine constitutional change (0–3).
Regional authority varies across countries, within countries between
regions, and over time, and the RAI captures this variety by provid-
ing scores per region on a yearly basis. Table 1.1 presents the countries,
regional tiers, election period and RAI scores.
Regional authority varies to a great extent across territory and across
time. The lowest RAI scores are to be found for Danish Regions (9.0),
French régions (8.0) and Greek nomoi and peripheries (8.0). The most pow-
erful regions can be found in the federal countries of Austria (18.0),
Belgium (20.0), Germany (21.0) and Switzerland (19.5), and the spe-
cial autonomous regions in Denmark (20.0) and Italy (18.0). In between
these two groups, we may find the regional tiers in unitary decentralized
countries of the Netherlands (provincies: 14.5), Norway (fylker: 10.0) and
Sweden (län: 10.0) and the regionalized states of Italy (regioni a statuto
ordinario: 14.0), Spain (comunidades autónomas about 15.0) and the UK
(Wales: 11.5; Scotland: 16.5).
Regional authority varies not only across countries but also between
regions within countries. The most notable examples are the different
RAI scores between various regions in Belgium (16.0–20.0), between the
amter/region (10.0/9.0) and the Faroe Islands (20.0) and Greenland (20.0)
in Denmark, between Corsica (8.5) and régions (8.0) in France, between
regioni a statuto ordinario (14.0) and regioni a statuto speciale (18.0) in
Italy, between the historic (15.5) and non-historic (15.0) comunidades
autónomas in Spain, and between the devolved institutions in the UK
(9.0–16.5).
Finally, regional authority has also changed over time. It has increased
for the regions in Austria, Belgium, Germany (western Länder), Italy,
the Netherlands and Spain. RAI scores have remained stable for the
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12 Introduction
Danish amter/regions, French régions, east German Länder, Greek nomoi
and peripheries, Norwegian fylker, Swedish län and Swiss cantons. There
are only two cases of centralization of authority, which happened for
Corsica (–0.5) and Northern Ireland when home rule was replaced by
deconcentrated government (a change from 9.5 to 1.0).
From this overview of the variation in and development of regional
authority, it follows that the extent to which regional elections are sub-
ordinate to the national electoral arena may be expected to vary to a
similar degree. The RAI measures formal institutional authority, and one
could argue that it underestimates the role of regional tiers in the pro-
vision of policies which is better assessed with fiscal decentralization
measures. Similarly, one could also argue that public perception on the
importance of the regional tier is what matters rather than institutional
or fiscal authority. Therefore we have asked the authors of the country
chapters to consider fiscal decentralization and, when available, public
opinion data alongside regional institutional authority.2
Regional election systems
Taking the second-order election model as a starting point has led
regional election scholars to focus on the timing of the regional elec-
tion in the national election cycle. When regional elections are held on
the same date as national elections, regional election outcomes mirror
those for national elections. However, as soon as the regional election
decouples from the national election cycle, differences in vote share
may appear. In their study of elections for the German Länder, Jeffery
and Hough (2001, p.76) argue that support for the main political parties
in regional elections follows a cyclical pattern. Governing parties enjoy
an (often painfully short) honeymoon period shortly after their elec-
tion victory with levels of support at times even rising higher than the
share of vote won. The honeymoon is followed by an (often rapid) drop
in support, which continues until roughly the middle of the legislative
period, when it ‘bottoms out’. At the same time, support for the main
opposition party increases. Only in the period immediately before the
next national election do the governing parties recover support (see also
Jeffery and Hough, 2003).
Next to vertical simultaneity of elections, one may also assume that
holding several (or all) regional elections simultaneously (i.e. horizon-
tal simultaneity) amplifies their second-order qualities by giving them
collective nationwide reach and resonance (Jeffery and Hough, 2006,
p.249). Schakel and Dandoy (2014) examine the effect of vertical and
horizontal simultaneity on turnout in regional elections in great detail.
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They identify six electoral cycle regimes according to whether regional
elections are held simultaneously with national, local and other regional
elections or follow their own independent election cycle. It appears
that turnout increases significantly according to the extent to which
elections are held concurrently.
Van der Eijk et al. (1996) argue that an increase in turnout for
concurrent elections is a consequence of the heightened political atmo-
sphere. Concurrent elections significantly increase turnout because
the interest of these elections – in terms of issues, candidates, par-
ties, media coverage and campaign spending – is multiplied (Matilla,
2003). When regional elections are held on the same date one may
expect greater involvement of candidates, media and parties from the
statewide electoral arena, thus creating an approximation of a first-
order, national poll. Table 1.2 shows the extent to which regional
elections are held simultaneously with national, local and other regional
elections.
Regional elections are rarely held simultaneously with national elec-
tions except in Sweden, where all local, regional and national elections
are held on the same date. However, Table 1.2 presents data for the
2000s, and regional elections have been held concurrently with national
elections in Austria (1945–1949), Belgium (1995–1999) and France
(1986), and incidentally with several elections in Andalusia and Austrian
and German Länder. Apart from simultaneity with national elections we
may differentiate between three electoral regimes:
1. All regional and local elections are held simultaneously. This is the
case for Denmark (amter/regions), Greece, Italy (regioni a statuto ordi-
nario), Norway, Spain (non-historic comunidades autónomas) and the
UK (Scotland and Wales).
2. All regional elections are held concurrently but on a different date
from that for local elections. This electoral cycle regime is present in
Belgium, France and the Netherlands.
3. Regional elections may follow their own independent election cycle.
This applies to Austrian and German Länder, the Faroe Islands and
Greenland, regioni a statuto speciale in Italy, the historic comunidades
autónomas in Spain, Swiss cantons, and the Greater London Authority
and Northern Ireland.
Table 1.2 also reports on the electoral rules which translate votes into
seats, the electoral thresholds and the number of rounds. Most regional
elections consist of one round, and only France and Greece have two
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rounds. The electoral threshold varies from 0 to 2 per cent and may
go up to 10 per cent in the case of some Swiss cantons. Most regional
election systems are proportional but mixed electoral systems apply to
(some) regions in France, Germany and the UK. Interestingly, majori-
tarian or plurality electoral systems can only be found in some Swiss
cantons.
The overview provided in Table 1.2 shows a huge variety in electoral
systems across countries and regions, which should contribute to the
heterogeneity of cross-regional voting behavior. Each chapter presents
further details about regional institutions and reports on changes
in the applied regional election systems (e.g. compulsory voting,
regional assembly–regional executive relationship and country-specific
provisions).
1.4. What is at stake: Territorial cleavages
A second important element which may increase the relevance of the
regional electoral arena is the extent to which regional elections are
used by voters to express preferences different from those expressed at
national elections. The basis of territorial cleavage theory lies in soci-
ological approaches which explain dissimilarity of party systems by
the extent to which territorial cleavages are politicized (Lijphart, 1977;
Livingston, 1956). Several scholars analyzing regional elections have
observed that if substate elections are held in areas with distinctive ter-
ritorial identities, voters are more likely to disconnect themselves from
the first-order arena and make different vote choices in the substate
context (Jeffery and Hough, 2009).
Increased dissimilarity between vote shares may be expected when
sociological differences are politicized by regional actors. Newman
(1996, p.7) ascribes the tendency for ethnic differences to be politicized
to ‘the rational desire [of social actors] to convert efficiently political
resources into political power’. Political actors adapt their demands and
presentation to the concerns and language of regionally differentiated
groups so as to maximize their influence on state policies. In sum, a
territorial cleavage approach predicts that the regional vote will be dif-
ferent from the national vote to the extent that regional voters have a
distinctive socioeconomic identity and, more so, to the extent that this
distinctive identity is mobilized by a regional party.
We differentiate between diversity with respect to language and his-
tory. Table 1.3 displays the regions which achieve positive scores on the
regional language and the regional history index developed by Fitjar
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Table 1.3 Regional diversity with regard to language and history
Country Regional language
index
Regional history
index
Austria Burgenland (1),
Carinthia (1)
Belgium Brussels (2), Flanders (2),
Wallonia (2)
Denmark Faroe Islands (3);
Greenland (3)
France Alsace (1); Aquitaine (2);
Brittany (2);
Languedoc-Rousillon (2);
Lorraine (1);
Nord-Pas de Calais (1)
Alsace (2); Lorraine (2);
Franche-Comte (1);
Languedoc-Rousillon (1);
Nord-Pas de Calais (1);
Rhone-Alpes (1);
Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (1)
Germany Saxony (1);
Schleswig-Holstein (1)
Baden-Wurttemberg (2);
Bavaria (2);
Brandeburg (1); Hesse (1);
Mecklenburg Vorpommern (1);
Nord Rhine-Westphalia (1);
Saxony (1);
Saxony-Anhalt (1);
Schleswig-Holstein (1);
Thuringia (1)
Greece Central Macedonia (1);
Thessaly (1)
Crete (3); Aegean Islands (2);
Central Macedonia (2); East
Macedonia (2);
Thrace (2); Epirus (1); Thessaly (1)
Italy Friuli-Venezia Giulia (3);
Sardinia (3);
Trentino Alto Adige (2);
Aosta Valley (1);
Piedmont (1); Sicily (1)
Friuli-Venezia Giulia (2);
Trentino Alto Adige (2); Aosta
Valley (1);
Lombardy (1); Piedmont (1);
Sardinia (1);
Sicily (1); Tuscany (1); Veneto (1)
The Netherlands Friesland (3)
Norway Finnmark (2)
Spain Balearic Islands (3);
Catalonia (3);
Galicia (3); Valencia (3);
Basque Country (2);
Navarre (1);
Basque Country (2); Catalonia (2);
Andalusia (1); Navarre (1);
Valencia (1)
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Sweden Norbotten (2) Halland (1); Jamtland (1);
Skane (1);
Vastra Gotaland (1)
Switzerland German-/French-speaking
cantons (2);
Ticino (1)
UK Scotland (2); Wales (2) Scotland (2)
Notes: Regional language index: This is made up of the following items, with one point awarded
for each: (1) there is an indigenous regional language that is different from the dominant
(plurality) language in the state; (2) the regional language is spoken by at least half of the
region’s population; (3) the language is not the dominant language of any state.
Regional history index: This is made up of the following three criteria, with one point
awarded for each: (1) the region has not been part of the current state since its formation;
(2) the region was not part of the current state for the entire twentieth century; (3) the region
has been an independent state.
Sources: Fitjar (2009, 2010); scores for Denmark and Switzerland are added by the editors.
(2009, 2010). The regional language index captures the importance
and indigenousness of regional languages in regions. The historical
sovereignty index captures the extent to which the region itself or states
other than the current sovereign have governed the territory.
A striking observation from Table 1.3 is that each country has one or
more regions where a group of people speak a minority language. Most
countries also have regions with a history of independence and most
notably those countries for which state formation happened relatively
late – that is, France, Greece, Germany and Italy. For Austria, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Norway and, to a lesser extent, France, Sweden and
the UK, the territorial cleavages only affect a minority of regions and
population. However, in Belgium, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, and to a
lesser extent Germany and Greece, territorial cleavages between regions
are omnipresent.
Territorial heterogeneity can be found with respect to an infinite
number of dimensions, but most authors relate voting patterns to
territorial cleavages with respect to ethnicity, language, religion, his-
tory or economy (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983;
Van Houten, 2007). The country chapters discuss territorial cleav-
ages with regard to religion and economy (or any other dimension)
when their authors think these cleavages impact on regional electoral
outcomes.3
Given the huge diversity in decentralization, the various regional
election systems and the huge diversity with respect to territorial cleav-
ages across regions and across time, we can only assume that electoral
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18 Introduction
behavior will vary to a similar extent. We would even argue that
homogenization of electoral behavior is actually the least likely outcome
one might expect. Yet Caramani (2004) observes a nationalization trend
of electoral behavior in West European national elections – that is, vot-
ers increasingly vote more alike across the territory. Caramani (2004,
p.291–292) offers an interesting hypothesis for the apparent paradox
between regional diversity and nationalization of electoral behavior:
‘federal structures reduce the expression of regional protest in the party
system by opening up institutional channels of voice’. If this claim
is true, then one expects the homogenization of electoral behavior in
national elections but not for regional elections. In the next section we
will describe the aspects according to which regional electoral behavior
will be analyzed in the country chapters.
1.5. Aspects of regional election behavior
We have chosen to focus on five central aspects of electoral behavior in
regional elections:
1. congruence of the vote between regional and national elections;
2. turnout in regional and national elections;
3. changes in vote shares between regional and national elections;
4. congruence between regional and national governments;
5. NSWP strength in regional and national elections.
Congruence of the vote describes the differences in vote share between
regional and national elections. The aim of this book is to assess how
far these differences in the vote are a reflection of the subordination of
regional elections to the national electoral arena or whether the differ-
ences are an indication of regionalized voting behavior. ‘Second-order
effects’ may be assessed by looking at turnout and changes in vote share
for parties in statewide government and opposition. ‘Regionalized elec-
tion behavior’ may be assessed by looking at government congruence
and NSWP strength. In other words, the second and third variables
reflect the ‘top-down’ line of research whereas the fourth and fifth vari-
ables allow us to develop a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Our strategy here is
to fix the dependent variables across the country chapters and to let the
country experts reflect upon the patterns they observe. In the remain-
der of this Introduction we will discuss the five dependent variables that
structure the analyses presented in this book.
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Congruence of the vote between regional and national elections
A comparison between regional and national election vote shares is
widely used to assess regional distinctiveness (see e.g. Pallares and
Keating, 2003; Jeffery and Hough, 2003, 2009; Skrinis and Teperoglou,
2008; Tronconi and Roux, 2009; Floridia, 2010). The objective of these
analyses is to assess the degree to which electoral results in a spe-
cific region diverge from those in another region or from the national
electoral arena. Most studies use a dissimilarity index to measure distinc-
tiveness in the vote. This index, sometimes referred to as the Lee Index,
is identical to the Pedersen Index of electoral volatility but, instead of
comparing an election with another earlier election, a regional election
is compared with a national election. The dissimilarity index is calcu-
lated by taking the sum of absolute differences between regional and
national vote shares for each party and dividing the sum by 2 (to avoid
double counting). The formula is
Dissimilarity= 1
2
n∑
i=1
|XiN −XiR|
where XiN is the percentage of the vote won by party i in a given national
election, N, and XiR is the percentage of the vote won by party i in the
closest (in time) regional election, R, to the national election in ques-
tion. Scores may vary from complete congruence/similarity (0 per cent)
to complete incongruence/dissimilarity (100 per cent).
An interesting aspect of the dissimilarity index is that we may vary
the comparison with respect to the type of election or vote share (i.e.
national elections (N) or regional elections (R)) in conjunction with the
territorial unit of analysis (i.e. national level (N) or regional level (R))
(Schakel, 2013). For instance, we may compare the national party sys-
tem at the national level (NN) with the regional or national election
result in a particular region (NN versus RR, or NN versus NR). We may
also compare the national vote with the regional vote in the same region
(NR versus RR). Finally, we may compare the regional election result
aggregated at the national level with a particular regional result (RN
versus RR).
The dissimilarity index is used by Hearl, Budge and Pearson (1996),
who compare the regional vote in national elections (NR) with the aggre-
gate national vote (NN). The dissimilarity index has also been used by
Jeffery and Hough (2003), who compare national election results in a
region with the results for regional elections in the same region (NR ver-
sus RR). Finally, Dupoirier (2004) uses the dissimilarity index in a third
10.1057/9781137025449 - Regional and National Elections in Western Europe, Edited by Régis Dandoy and Arjan Schakel
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
ww
.p
al
gr
av
ec
on
ne
ct
.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ur
ich
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
ve
Co
nn
ec
t -
 2
01
4-
09
-1
7
20 Introduction
way, comparing the results of a party in one region with the results of
the same party across all regions (RN versus RR).
The variety in dissimilarity indices does not contribute to our under-
standing of regional elections because findings and conclusions may be
dependent on the measurement used. To prevent this from happening,
here we follow the approach laid down by Schakel (2013), who concep-
tualizes and operationalizes dissimilarity or congruence of the vote in
three ways. NN –RR evaluates the extent to which a particular regional
party system is different from the national party system, which is the
result of two sources of variation: the extent to which a regional elec-
torate is different from the national electorate combined with the extent
to which the regional electorate switch their vote between regional and
national elections. The regional election is compared with the national
election and, at the same time, the national electorate is compared with
the regional electorate.
To tease out the two sources of variation in party-system congru-
ence (NN –RR), one needs to consider electorate congruence (NN –NR)
and election congruence (NR –RR). Electorate congruence (NN –NR) taps
into the extent to which a particular regional electorate is different from
the national electorate. The type of election is held constant and one
compares national election results for the whole country with those for
a particular region. The benefit of this conceptualization is that one does
not have to consider second-order election effects because one uses first-
order election results only. A possible drawback of this conceptualization
is that it could lead to an underestimation of regional distinctiveness
because it does not consider the effect of dual voting – that is, party sys-
tems may appear more congruent than they really are because statewide
parties typically perform better in national than in regional elections.
In contrast, election congruence (NR –RR) evaluates the extent to which
a regional electorate votes differently in national and regional elections.
This conceptualization keeps the regional electorate constant but varies
the type of election. One benefit is that the effects of dual voting are
incorporated, but one underestimates dissimilarity because regionally
distinct electorates may express their distinctiveness in both regional
and national elections with low dissimilarity scores as a result.
In this volume we explore the conditions under which the regional
vote tends to differentiate from the national vote by reflecting upon
the patterns in the three operationalizations of congruence of the vote.
Dissimilarity is calculated for those parties which obtained at least
5 per cent of the regional vote in national elections (NR). The vote share
obtained in national elections (i.e. NN or NR) is compared with the
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closest in time regional election vote share (RR). The data come from
Schakel (2013) and are updated where relevant by the authors of the
country chapters.
Turnout in regional and national elections
The aim of this volume is to assess how far congruence in the vote can be
attributed to the subordinate status of regional elections to the national
electoral arena. One of the clear predictions of the second-order election
model is that turnout should be low or, at least, lower in the subordinate
election than in the first-order election. The rationale is that there is ‘less
at stake’ in the second-order arena and ‘what is important is the political
situation of the first-order arena at the moment when the second-order
election is being held’ (Reif, 1985, p.8). Consequently, voters are not
bothered about turning out for regional elections. Many regional elec-
tion scholars compare turnout between national and regional elections
to evaluate second-order effects (Pallares and Keating, 2003; Jeffery and
Hough, 2009; Floridia, 2010). Comparative studies of turnout in regional
elections are rare (we found one: Henderson and McEwen, 2010), espe-
cially when compared with the number of studies devoted to national
turnout (see the literature reviews by Geys, 2006; Blais, 2006; Blais and
Dobrzynska, 1998). Here we analyze turnout, defined as the number of
voters who cast a vote (voters) as a proportion of the total number of vot-
ers who are allowed to cast a vote (electorate), in regional and national
elections. Turnout data come from Schakel and Dandoy (2014) and are
updated where relevant by the authors of the country chapters.
Vote share changes between regional and national elections
Another prediction of the second-order election model is that parties
in national government will lose votes whereas those in the opposi-
tion will gain votes in regional elections. Moreover, voters’ propensity
to behave in these ways follows a cyclical logic: they are most likely
to do so at the midpoint between elections that produce national gov-
ernments, and less likely to do so soon after, or in the run-up to, an
election that produces a state-level government. Although this is one
of the strongest predictions of the second-order election model, surpris-
ingly it has had little systematic empirical testing in the case of regional
elections. Notable exception is the work by Jeffery and Hough (2001,
2003, 2009) on electoral cycles and multilevel voting in Germany, Spain
and the UK.
In this book, second-order election effects are explored by calculating
changes in vote share for government and opposition parties. Vote share
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change is calculated by subtracting the vote share obtained in regional
elections from that received in the previous national election. This oper-
ationalization implies that second-order election data are constructed
for only those parties which compete in national and regional elections.
Data on vote share change are obtained from Schakel and Jeffery (2013)
and are updated where relevant by the authors of the country chapters.
Government congruence between regional and national
electoral arenas
Government participation in a multilevel setting raises new questions
for parties. For example, ‘To step in government at only one level or
to stay in opposition at both? To opt for a single consistent strategy
or to try out various, but sometimes conflicting, coalition formulae?
To replicate coalition agreements at the federal level or to adapt them
to the regional context, even if this means departing from a coherent
party line?’ (S¸tefuriuc, 2009a, p.2). Similar to parties, voters are also
faced with new questions. They are confronted by the possibility of
voting for the preferred party they wish to see in regional government
or wanting to send a signal to the party in statewide government by
voting for the party in opposition in the national parliament. The for-
mer represents regionalized voting behavior whereas the latter indicates
the subordinate nature of the regional election to the national electoral
arena.
The extent to which a regional voter will hold the national or regional
government accountable depends on the structure of the party system.
In two-party systems (e.g. Greece, Spain UK), voting for the opposi-
tion party in the national parliament sends a clear message to the
party in national government. In contrast with two-party systems,
voters in multiparty systems are often confronted by coalition govern-
ments at both the national and regional tiers, which blur government
responsibility, especially when the members of the coalition are in part
overlapping. As a result, two-party systems may be more conducive to
second-order election effects than multilevel party systems.
The extent to which a regional voter is able to hold the national
or regional government accountable also depends on the role that the
region plays in national decision-making. For example, in Germany,
Land governments directly elect their representatives in the Bundesrat
(upper chamber), which has veto power over about 60 per cent of leg-
islative acts. Government congruence therefore has a direct bearing on
national politics, and the vote for the opposition party in national par-
liament may have huge consequences for federal policies. The German
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voter has a unique opportunity to balance the federal government party
at both the national and the regional level by voting for the opposition
in Land elections.
Looking at aggregate-level election results will not allow us to reveal
the considerations that regional voters might take into account when
they cast their vote. The authors will report on ticket-split voting when
voter survey data are available but, unfortunately, regional election sur-
veys are scarce. One way to explore the extent to which voters hold
governments accountable is to look at government congruence. For
example, in case of complete government incongruence (e.g. Labour in
Wales and the Conservatives in Westminster), we are not able to assess
whether a vote share gain for the party in regional government is a voter
reward for the party in regional government or a punishment for the
party in national government. However, in case of government congru-
ence (e.g. Labour in Wales and Labour in Westminster), we are more
confident that a vote share gain for the party in regional government
is a reward given by the voters to regional performance because accord-
ing to the second-order election model, Labour should have lost vote
share. Hence the extent and frequency of government congruence may
serve as an indirect measure of a regionalized behavior in regional elec-
tions, although this measurement needs to be interpreted with great
care and with consideration for the party system structure and particular
institutional settings.
In analogy to congruence of the vote, government congruence may
be conceptualized as the extent to which regional and national gov-
ernments are similar (Däubler and Debus, 2009; Deschouwer, 2009a;
S¸tefuriuc, 2009b; Swenden, 2002; Wilson, 2009). Government con-
gruence is indicated by a dissimilarity index but, in contrast with
congruence in the vote, there is only one operationalization – namely,
the national government (NN) is compared with the regional govern-
ment (RR). Another difference is that seat shares instead of vote shares
for the governing parties are taken. The government congruence data
are compiled by the authors of country chapters.
Non-statewide party strength in regional and national elections
An important cause of diverging regional and national party systems is
the presence of what has been labeled nationalist, regional, regionalist
or NSWPs. We prefer to adopt the term ‘NSWP’ for two reasons. First, the
NSWP is defined as a party which participates in elections in only part
of the country in contrast to statewide parties which participate in all
elections across the statewide territory. Often, a regional party is defined
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as receiving its vote share in one region only (Brancati, 2008). However,
this operationalization would exclude parties such as the Lega Nord in
Italy and the PDS in Germany, which participate in elections in more
than one but not all regions. The Lega Nord participates in elections in
the northern part of Italy and the PDS was mainly present in the East
German Länder. These contribute clearly to the territorial heterogeneity
of the vote and would not be on our ‘radar’ when we apply a very strict
definition.
A second advantage of using the concept of NSWP is that it is neutral
with regard to the ideology of the party. This allows the authors of the
country chapters to discuss the ideology of the NSWPs that they find in
their country. Dandoy (2010) identifies protectionist, decentralist and
secessionist parties. Protectionist parties seek to defend the interests of a
culturally and linguistically defined minority. Decentralist parties chal-
lenge the division of power between the central state and the region.
Finally, secessionist parties seek to detach the region from its host state
in order to establish an independent state. To this classification we
may add those non-statewide parties which ‘defend’ or ‘represent’ the
region on some kind of ideological basis. For example, an NSWP may
make a claim for more state subsidies for a relatively poor region or
for less fiscal equalization between regions to the benefit of an affluent
region.
One should be careful in taking the presence of NSWPs as direct evi-
dence of regionalized election behavior. One of the predictions of the
second-order election model is that small parties should gain vote share
in regional elections. Most NSWPs are small parties, particularly in a
national context. One way to avoid the pitfall of wrongly interpreting
NSWP strength as regionalized election behavior is to take a closer look
at the ideology of these parties. Therefore, the authors will discuss the
issues that these parties emphasize to attract the regional voter.
We present vote share data for NSWPs obtained in regional and
national elections. Data on NSWPs come from Massetti and Schakel
(2013) and are updated and amended where relevant by the authors
of the country chapters.
1.6. This book
This book analyzes regional elections for 13 countries in Western Europe
(see Table 1.1). In total we analyze 2309 elections held in 254 regions in
13 countries between 1945 and 2011. The 13 country chapters appear
in alphabetical order and each author explores the explanatory power
10.1057/9781137025449 - Regional and National Elections in Western Europe, Edited by Régis Dandoy and Arjan Schakel
Co
py
rig
ht
 m
at
er
ia
l f
ro
m
 w
ww
.p
al
gr
av
ec
on
ne
ct
.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 U
ZH
 H
au
pt
bi
bl
io
th
ek
 / 
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ur
ich
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
ve
Co
nn
ec
t -
 2
01
4-
09
-1
7
Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy 25
of regional institutions and territorial cleavages (top-down or deductive
approach) with respect to regional electoral behavior, but they also pro-
pose additional causes for diverging regional party systems when they
think that these factors should be considered as well (bottom-up or
inductive approach).
To enhance comparison we have adopted a common framework for
the chapters. Each begins with an introduction, which is followed by
a section on ‘Regional government and regional elections’. The anal-
ysis of election data starts with an examination of ‘Congruence of
the vote’. The fourth section looks at ‘Second-order election effects’,
and the authors analyze turnout and vote share changes between the
regional and the previous national election. The next section looks
specifically for evidence of ‘Regionalization of the vote’ with the help
of government congruence and the presence and strength of NSWPs.
In the conclusion to each chapter, the authors address the question
of how far regional elections in their country are nationalized or
regionalized. To further enhance comparison across the chapters we
have standardized measurements, figures and tables.
We have assembled data on the five aspects of regional election behav-
ior, and the full variation across regions and parties, and over time,
are provided in country Excel files, which include 5 figures and 17
tables. The Excel files and the codebook are published on a webpage
to accompany this book on the website (www.arjanschakel.nl) of one of
the editors (A.S.). The authors of the country chapters reflect upon the
most interesting figures and tables, which means that not all figures and
tables are discussed. Readers who would like access to the data or would
like more detail are advised to download the country Excel files.
In the Conclusion (Chapter 15) we draw comparisons between the
country chapters and discuss the proposed independent variables and
their effects on regional voting patterns. There we consider what we
have learned from the in-depth country studies and point out implica-
tions for the study on regional elections.
Notes
1. Regional elections also occur in Finland (Åland) and in Portugal (Açores
and Madeira) but since these insular regions only represent a small por-
tion of the national territory and population, they are not included in this
book.
2. In an appendix to the book which is published online (www.arjanschakel.
nl), we discuss regional government according to fiscal decentralization data
published by Eurostat (2012), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
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and Development (1997) and Stegarescu (2005), and according public to per-
ceptions by drawing on the Special Eurobarometer 307 commissioned by the
European Commission (2009).
3. In the appendix to the book (see www.arjanschakel.nl) we provide a discussion
about regional diversity with regard to economic affluence by drawing on
Eurostat (2012) data on regional gross domestic product per capita.
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